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DIGITAL GREENBACKS
A SEQUENCED ‘TREASURY DIRECT’ AND ‘FED WALLET’
PLAN FOR THE DEMOCRATIC DIGITAL DOLLAR
Robert Hockett*
Abstract
I propose means of immediately converting the Department of
Treasury’s existing Treasury Direct system of freely available transaction
accounts into a publicly administered digital savings and payments
platform. A platform of this type is an essential public utility in any
commercial society such as our own. It is additionally growth-promoting
inasmuch as growth-tracking Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is a
measure of transaction volume, while transaction volume is a function of
more efficient and inclusive transacting. As Congress seeks means of
streamlining the payments infrastructure in a time of pandemic-induced
crisis, the Treasury route recommends itself as the fastest way to digitize
payments for 95% of our citizens and business enterprises. I also map
means of migrating the Treasury architecture to the Federal Reserve
System (Fed) over time once the crisis is past—as the “Greenback” paper
dollar itself did in the late 19th and early 20th centuries—and include my
draft Treasury Dollar Act as an Appendix.
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INTRODUCTION
Since Facebook’s announcement of its Libra proposal in June of 2019,
monetary authorities worldwide have redoubled their efforts to develop
central bank digital currencies (CBDCs).1 These efforts were underway
even before Libra, and for very good reasons. Facebook’s announcement
accordingly did no more than accelerate already ongoing developments.2
The sudden slowdown in productive activity worldwide brought on
by the Coronavirus pandemic of 2020 makes matters more urgent. The
social distancing measures necessitated by the pandemic are antithetical
to productive activity—and, in turn, the pay people earn through
productive activity.3 “ Knowledge workers” might be able to collaborate
remotely, but production line workers and delivery personnel cannot.4
Economies worldwide are thus confronted by simultaneous supply side
and demand side shocks.5 The U.S. economy is no exception—indeed it
appears to be worst hit of all.6

1. See Robert Hockett, Facebook’s Proposed CryptoCurrency—More Pisces than Libra
for Now, FORBES (June 20, 2019, 2:03 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/rhockett/2019/06/20/
facebooks-proposed-crypto-currency-more-pisces-than-libra-for-now/ [https://perma.cc/K9X88GFU] (explaining that the world’s central banks are looking to upgrade their domestic and
overseas payment systems by availing themselves of new technology).
2. Id.
3. See Robert Hockett, An Immediate Relief Plan for Coronavirus-Related Economic
Mitigation 4 (Cornell L. Sch., Research Paper No. 20-28, 2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3567855 [https://perma.cc/5UPH-2THB]; Robert Hockett, Managing
Coronavirus’s Economic Fallout—Demand and Supply Side Measures, FORBES (Mar. 16, 2020,
1:02 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/rhockett/2020/03/16/managing-coronaviruss-economicfallout-demand-and-supply-side-measures/ [https://perma.cc/P9PZ-PRKJ]; see also Robert
Hockett, We’re at War and Need Wartime Institutions to Keep Our Economy Producing What’s
Necessary, THE HILL (Apr. 4, 2020, 2:00 PM), https://thehill.com/opinion/white-house/491166were-at-war-and-need-wartime-institutions-to-keep-our-economy-producing [https://perma.cc/
KC57-TK4H] (‘The virus . . . is threatening our way of life and destroying our productive capacity
and economic health.’).
4. See Robert Hockett, White Paper: How to Mobilize the Military to Produce Pandemic‐
Responsive Supplies in Adequate Quantity, NEW CONSENSUS 4 (Mar. 17, 2020),
https://newconsensus.com/files/pandemic-production.pdf; Robert Hockett, Our Corona
Response’s Missing Ingredient—Mobilize the Supply Side!, FORBES (Mar. 18, 2020, 12:29 PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/rhockett/2020/03/18/our-corona-responses-missing-ingredient-mobilize-the-supply-side [https://perma.cc/M7HJ-G36J]; see also Robert Hockett, The US Must
Take Equity Stakes in the Companies it Rescues, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 28, 2020),
https://www.ft.com/content/86a333d0-6dc3-11ea-89df-41bea055720b [https://perma.cc/LS996DDA]; Robert Hockett, The US Needs to Tackle the Coronavirus Pandemic with a Playbook out
of the Great Depression and World War II, not the Financial Crisis, BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 29,
2020, 9:42 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/coronavirus-pandemic-us-should-ramp-upventilator-mask-manufacturing-2020-3 [https://perma.cc/AM7S-FW89].
5. See sources cited supra notes 3–4.
6. See sources cited supra notes 3–4.
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To arrest, minimize, and reverse these shocks, simultaneous demand
and supply side measures must be taken as quickly as possible. This
means that our capacities to store and transfer value—to make and
receive payments and disburse moneys—must be sped up as well.7
Whatever we are able to do, both to optimize our payments architecture
and to speed up that optimization effort, we must do. In so doing, we will
not only optimize a pandemic response architecture but also optimize the
payments infrastructure, with which we shall live and prosper long after
the present pandemic is past.8
Digital currencies are ideal means to this optimization. The reasons
are straightforward. A currency is simply “that which pays” in a payment
system and “that which counts” in a value accounting system.9 To design
a digital currency is to design a digital savings and payments platform. It
is to design a literal speed-of-light mechanism of value storage and
transfer. It is to deliver a banking and financial architecture by supplying
a commercial architecture, as is the case in any “commercial society” or
“exchange economy” such as our own.10
Fortunately, Congress is keen on this idea. Since late March, both
Democrats and Republicans in both chambers have weighed proposals—
including one of my own to which this Article is devoted—to pass
legislation on a digital dollar and associated system of digital wallets. My
own Inclusive Value Ledger (IVL) Plan, which has colloquially come to
be known as the Public Venmo Plan since its draft bill was proposed in
the New York State Assembly and Senate last year, can be instituted by
municipal, state, or national authorities, and can be administered by either
the Fed or Treasury at the national level.11

7. See Robert Hockett & Lawrence Rufrano, Digital Dollars for All, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 6,
2020, 7:18 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/digital-dollars-for-all-11586215100 [https://perma
.cc/8TR9-BTDS]; see also Robert Hockett, Why Now for a Digital Treasury Dollar? Because
Coronavirus, FORBES (Mar. 29, 2020, 8:36 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/rhockett/2020/03/
29/why-now-for-a-digital-treasury-dollar-because-coronavirus/ [https://perma.cc/EE7Y-643V].
8. See sources cited supra note 7; see also Robert Hockett, Anshul Gupta & Lawrence
Rufrano, A Digital Dollar – Why, How, and Why Now, VENTUREBEAT (Apr. 18, 2020, 12:12 PM),
https://venturebeat.com/2020/04/18/a-digital-dollar-why-how-and-why-now/ [https://perma.cc/
9JYZ-SHBJ].
9. Robert Hockett, The Democratic Digital Dollar: A Digital Savings and Payments
Platform for Inclusive State, Local, and National Money and Banking Systems, 10 HARVARD BUS.
L. REV. ONLINE, 2019–2020, at 1, 2.
10. Id. at 4; see also Robert Hockett, The Capital Commons: Digital Money and Citizens’
Finance in a Productive Consumer Republic (2018) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
author) [hereinafter Hockett, Capital Commons].
11. See generally Robert Hockett, The Empire State Inclusive Value Ledger: A Peer‐to‐
Peer Savings & Payments Platform for an All-Embracing and Dynamic State Economy (Cornell
L. Sch. Research Paper No. 19-39, 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
_id=3470923 [https://perma.cc/FBE7-EKRB].
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For reasons rooted in both the “need for speed” and the need for
inclusion in the midst of a pandemic, I aim with this Article to lay out my
IVL Plan in both its Treasury and Fed renditions. The Treasury already
possesses the requisite infrastructure for expeditious implementation and,
partly for this reason, both Senators and Representatives in both party
caucuses and in both chambers of Congress have been considering the
plan since last March. There accordingly seems to be a need for a full
discussion on the Treasury and Fed plans, their relation to one another,
and their prompting considerations—including the simplicity and speed
with which these plans, in comparison to others, can be sequentially set
up and operated. This Article supplies these discussions. Part I provides
background. Part II maps the Treasury plan. Part III charts the Fed plan.
Part IV concludes and looks forward, while the Appendix includes a bill
I have drafted for quick introduction and passage in Congress.
I. BACKGROUND: THE DEMOCRATIC DIGITAL DOLLAR, THE INCLUSIVE
VALUE LEDGER, AND THE FED & TREASURY RENDITIONS THEREOF
I will begin by first sketching the basic structure that I believe a
maximally efficient digital payment platform and wallet system will
require, along with my reasoning for the structure. I will borrow a
metaphor from the automotive sector and call this structure the plan’s
“chassis,” onto which any number of distinct “bodies” selected by any
level of government can then be installed.
A. The IVL “Chassis”
As noted above, my “Public Venmo” IVL Plan is already under
consideration in New York. In the autumn of 2019 two visionary New
York state legislators—Assemblyman Ron Kim and State Senator Julia
Salazar—proposed legislation I had drafted to institute what I call a
“Democratic Digital Dollar” and its associated “Inclusive Value
Ledger,” or “Public Venmo” platform.12 In New York, we call it ‘The
12. Id.; Assembly: https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/bills/2021/A3138; Senate:
https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/bills/2019/s6792 A.B. A088686, 2019-20 Gen. Assemb.,
Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2020), https://assembly.state.ny.us/leg/?default_fld=&bn=A08686&Summary
=Y&Actions=Y&Text=Y. For a sampling of this author’s columns and opeds on the plan, several
co‐authored with the legislators who have introduced it to the New York state legislature, see,
e.g., Assemblyman Ron Kim & Robert Hockett, Dynamic Inclusive Money for a Dynamic
Inclusive Economy, AM. PROSPECT (Oct. 17, 2019), https://prospect.org/economy/dynamicinclusive-money-economy/ [https://perma.cc/GHZ3-KQPD] (explaining why the economy must
allow money to flow in a way that is ‘inclusive’); Robert Hockett & Ron Kim, Our New Currency
for New York, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Oct. 28, 2019, 2:31 PM), https://www.nydailynews.com/
opinion/ny-oped-new-currency-for-new-yorks-poor-20191029-uevs4nbx7fdwtbrlzgerdos664story.html (explaining how the IVL will put money back into New York’s economy and create a
more even distribution of funds); Robert Hockett, Ron Kim & Julia Salazar, Our Money’s Not
Green Enough, FORBES (Nov. 9, 2019, 8:48 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/rhockett/2019/
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Empire State Inclusive Value Ledger Plan.’13
Although this innovative legislation was introduced at the state level,
the IVL Plan design is meant to function as a sort of “chassis” onto
which any number of “bodies” can be installed at the local, state, or
federal levels—not to mention counterpart levels in the Eurozone and
beyond.14 At the federal level, it can be established and administered by
either the Fed or the Treasury.
1. Basic Architecture
The plan’s architecture is strikingly simple. It requires only two
functional steps. First, every person and business receives a smartphone
or smart‐device‐accessible digital wallet, with both (a) “vertical”
connectivity to the public treasury and (b) “horizontal” (essentially P2P)
connectivity to all other digital wallets.15 All wallet holders are then
able “vertically” to pay taxes, licensing fees, and other remittances, as
well as receive tax refunds, program moneys, and other disbursements
over the IVL. Additionally, all users can “horizontally” make real time
payments to one another.16
11/12/our-moneys-not-green-enough/ [https://perma.cc/YKM2-F8A5] (describing how the IVL
system will work); Helen Partz, Authors of New York’s P2P ‘Public Venmo’ Bill Hope for Greater
Decentralization, COIN TELEGRAPH (Jan. 10, 2020), https://cointelegraph.com/news/ authors-ofnew-yorks-p2p-public-venmo-bill-hope-for-greater-decentralization [https://perma.cc/4WUZL6LY] (describing how ‘new technologies’ will be used for the IVL); New York Digital Currency
Proposed for P2P Payments, LEDGER INSIGHTS (Jan. 2020), https://www.ledgerinsights.com/newyork-digital-currency-proposed-p2p-payments/ [https://perma.cc/59CZ-CA6N] (explaining how
others are working to recreate economic ‘architecture’); Jordan Heal, New York Lawmakers
Propose Statewide Cryptocurrency, YAHOO! FINANCE (Jan. 9, 2020), https://finance.yahoo.com/
news/york-lawmakers-propose-statewide-cryptocurrency-100001080.html
[https://perma.cc/
WGZ9-7FXH] (describing the IVL cryptocurrency); New York Lawmakers Push for Public
eBanking System, PYMNTS.COM (Jan. 8, 2020), https://www.pymnts.com/news/digitalbanking/2020/ny-lawmakers-push-for-public-ebanking-system/ [https://perma.cc/K2AX-8E59]
(outlining the “push” for an online banking system in New York); Jordana Rosenfeld, New York
Is Proposing the Creation of a ‘Public Venmo,’ VICE (Jan. 7, 2020, 8:00 AM), https://www.vice
.com/en_us/article/pked9v/new-york-is-proposing-the-creation-of-a-public-venmo [https://perm
a.cc/AW5E-VES7] (describing the IVL as a “public Venmo”).
13. See sources cited supra note 12 and accompanying text. On naming, one might envisage
a comparable Lone Star IVL for Texas, a Crescent City IVL for New Orleans, a Continental IVL
for the U.S., and so on.
14. See Robert Hockett, Open the Marriage to Save It: A Peer-to-Peer Savings & Payments
Platform and Complementary Digital Euro Plan (Cornell L. Sch. Research Paper No. 19-40,
2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3470934 [https://perma.cc/W8ECTGXS].
15. See Hockett, supra note 9; see also Hockett, Capital Commons, supra note 10; Robert
Hockett, Rousseauvian Money 7 (Cornell L. Sch. Research Paper No. 18-48, 2018),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3278408 [https://perma.cc/W6DH-7CJT]
(discussing vertical and horizontal dimensions).
16. See sources cited supra notes 9–12.
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2. Pictographic Representation
Diagrammatically, then, things look as depicted in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Basic IVL Chassis

In the diagram, lines without arrows represent institutional linkages,
while arrowed lines represent payment instructions and associated value
flows. A payment occurs when the Payor instructs the Master Account
Administrator, via a chip card, strip card, or smart device payment app
(Payment Step 1), to debit her own wallet account in the Master Account
and correspondingly credit the Payee’s wallet account in the Master
Account (Payment Step 2).17
At Implementation Stage 1 (the “vertical” stage) of IVL Plan
implementation, counterparties in any such transaction will comprise one
public and one private sector party. This is already possible through
Treasury Direct Accounts as explained in Sections II.A.3 and III below.
17. I maintain a calculated ambiguity as among “wallets” and “accounts” throughout this
Article for reasons rooted in fintech industry parlance. Pursuant to the latter, “wallets” hold
“coins” that are legal tender, while “accounts” neither are nor “contain” legal tender, but instead
represent liabilities on the part of account administrators to tender legal tender on account-holder
demand. Where the issuer of the legal tender in question is also the administrator of the “account”
in question, the distinction accordingly collapses—“wallet” and “account” then designate the
same thing. See Hockett, Capital Commons, supra note 10, for full discussion.
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At Implementation Stage 2 (the “horizontal” stage) of IVL Plan
implementation, all wallet account holders in the system, public sector or
private sector, will be able to make and receive payments to and from one
another in the same manner. This is all that need be added to Treasury
Direct wallets to convert them to universally functioning value-storage
(saving) and value-transfer (payment) media.
B. Virtues of the IVL Chassis
There are a number of reasons, especially supplemented by recent
crises-rooted needs, to put a proposal like the IVL Plan into place to get
non-paper stimulus monies expeditiously to hard-hit American businesses
and individuals.18 We can briefly discuss those reasons here.
1. Justice and Inclusion
In any “exchange economy” such as our own, a payments system must
be considered an essential public utility on a par with roads, sidewalks,
and the national currency. Justice requires we make such utilities usable
by all at no cost. Just as people do not pay to use sidewalks or dollar bills,
they should not have to pay to use a digital payment system in an
increasingly digitized exchange economy.19
2. Growth and Efficiency
We measure the size and the growth of our economy by reference to
transaction volume.20 That is all GDP is—a measure of transaction
volume. It follows that a more seamless and efficient payment system, by
enabling more rapid transacting and hence larger transaction volumes
within any time interval, means greater growth and a larger economy over
time. So does greater inclusion itself. Call this the growth or efficiency
reason for IVL.
3. Fiscal and Monetary Policy (Including “Helicopter Money”)
Transmission
The presence of an IVL system, once in place, offers a host of
collateral benefits. If administered by a nation’s fiscal or monetary
authority—the Treasury or the Federal Reserve in the U.S.—it will enable
18. Paper is a very efficient vector of Coronavirus, which is why China has been literally
laundering its paper money since February. Jesse Yeung, China is Disinfecting and Destroying
Cash to Contain the Coronavirus, CNN BUS. (Feb. 17, 2020), https://www.cnn.com/2020/02/
17/asia/china-is-disinfecting-cash-coronavirus-intl-hnk-scli/index.html [https://perma.cc/H2JKZNUH].
19. See Hockett, supra note 9; Hockett, Capital Commons, supra note 10; Hockett,
Rousseauvian Money, supra note 15.
20. See sources cited supra note 19; see also Kim & Hockett, supra note 12.
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faster fiscal stimulus or monetary policy transmission than our present
system of middlemen, whom we hope will transmit inexpensive credit to
consumers.21 Instead, we can drop digital “helicopter money” into our
digital wallets, thereby sidestepping the notorious “pushing on a string”
and diversion-to-speculative-use problems that hampered stimulus efforts
in 2008.22 In less extraordinary times, we can even offer interest on
savings in wallets, whereupon we can move those rates up or down when
we must slow down or speed up spending activity economy-wide.23
Indeed, we can even then “micro‐target” specific sectors of the economy
where spending appears to be either overheating or dangerously cooling,
another prospect considered below and more fully fleshed out in other
work.24
4. Valuing Care Work
An IVL system would also enable public authorities, including cities
and states, to begin disbursing monetary rewards to “care work”
providers and other contributors to the public good that our present
payment arrangements render too difficult for most governments to
adjudge feasible.25 A teenager who helps grade-schoolers with homework
after school, for example, or someone who looks in on and cares for a
“shut-in,” can quickly transmit digital proof of work (POW) to a city,
state, or even federal social services authority and receive spendable IVL
credits—what I call Democratic Digital Dollars, or 3Ds—in return.26
Given the long-term savings to municipal, state, and federal budgets that

21. See, e.g., Hockett, supra note 9; Hockett, Capital Commons, supra note 10.
22. See sources cited supra notes 9–10; see also Daniel Alpert, Robert Hockett & Nouriel
Roubini, The Way Forward, NEW AMERICA (Oct. 10, 2011), https://www.newamerica.org/
economic-growth/policy-papers/the-way-forward/ [https://perma.cc/2ZZQ-744G].
23. See sources cited supra note 22. This is a prospect, incidentally, that might
recommend—though certainly it does not mandate—migrating a Treasury system in time to the
Fed, as discussed infra Section III.A.
24. See, e.g., Robert Hockett, How to Make QE More Helpful: By Fed Shorting of
Commodities, BENZINGA (Oct. 14, 2011, 8:41 PM), https://www.benzinga.com/news/11/10/1988
109/how-to-make-qe-more-helpful-by-fed-shorting-of-commodities [https://perma.cc/6G87DL32]; Robert Hockett, The Green New Deal: How We Will Pay for It Isn’t ‘a Thing’ – and
Inflation Isn’t Either, FORBES (Jan. 16, 2019, 7:15 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/rhockett/
2019/01/16/the-green-new-deal-how-we-will-pay-for-it-isnt-a-thing-and-inflation-isnt-either/
[https://perma.cc/7DZF-UTJV]; Robert Hockett, Pay for the Green New Deal Now or Spend More
Later, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 3, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/046e7c30-23c8-11e9-b20d-5376
ca5216eb.
25. See Hockett, supra note 9; Hockett, supra note 11; Hockett & Kim, supra note 12, Kim
& Hockett, supra note 12.
26. For examples of an IVL system’s disbursing monetary rewards to ‘care work’ providers
and other contributors to the public good, see sources cited supra note 25.
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such work demonstrably affords, crediting over the IVL is readily
justified on long-term fiscal grounds, let alone ‘Good Society’ grounds.27
5. Data and Financial Privacy
Finally, going digital offers financial data privacy benefits as well.
Unlike private sector banks and many online payment service firms,
public sector administrators of the IVL do not have a profit incentive—
there are no non-criminal “carrots” to entice data harvest and sale. Such
administrators also are subject to Fourth Amendment constraints as state
actors. unlike, say, Wells Fargo or Facebook—there is a “stick.” Adding
more sticks through criminal law, moreover, along with especially hard
encryption for all transactions in amounts lower than what we already
require banks and other institutions to report under anti-terrorism and antimoney laundering law, is easily done on an IVL system.28
No matter how one looks at the matter, then, it seems clear we should
do this. Commercial and financial inclusion, more rapid economic
growth, leak-proof fiscal stimulus and monetary policy, valuing
undervalued work, and tightening financial privacy . . . there seems little
not to like. All such features, additionally, grow more attractive in times
of crisis like the present.
The real question, then, is who best to administer the IVL. Should it
be cities, states, or our federal government? If it’s the latter, should it be
the Fed or the Treasury?29
C. Federal Bodies for the Chassis—Fed or Treasury?
In light of the present pandemic and the nationwide financial stresses
to which it is giving rise, it seems clear that whatever New York and other
states or their subdivisions might do, we will do better to install a federal
body on the IVL chassis than to rely solely on those more jurisdictionally
circumscribed units of government.30 The same reasons that underwrite
this judgment seem to suggest also that the Treasury body would be
preferable to the Fed body, at least in the short-run—even if we should
decide ultimately to migrate the system over to the Fed, as we did with
the paper dollar about a century ago.31
27. For support that crediting certain work over an IVL system is justified on long-term
fiscal grounds in addition to “Good Society” grounds, see sources cited supra note 25.
28. For support that an IVL system can offer financial data privacy benefits, see sources
cited supra note 25.
29. The Eurozone, of course, invites counterpart questions. Hockett, supra note 14, at 5.
30. See sources cited supra notes 1, 7–8.
31. Hockett et al., supra note 8. For more on that migration, along with the Greenback, see
discussion infra Section II.A; see also Robert Hockett, Money’s Past and Fintech’s Future:
Wildcat Crypto, the Digital Dollar, and Citizen Central Banking, 2 STAN. J. BLOCKCHAIN L. &
POL’Y 221, 228–30 (2019).
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1. Why Federal?
The reason that I designed the IVL plan to be adaptable to local, state,
and national use in the first place, stems in part from lessons I learned in
the last crisis. In 2008, at the onset of a financial meltdown rooted in an
underwater mortgage loan meltdown, I developed a plan that permitted
public sector entities to employ their eminent domain authority to make
compulsory purchases of underwater mortgage loans out of the private
label securitization (PLS) trusts in which they were improvidently
locked, then write them down and return them to the trusts.32
These were loans that even trusts’ bondholders wished to see writtendown to avert default-prompted losses, as default risk lowered the
expected values of mortgage loans by margins well below the level
required to pull these loans back above water.33 The problem was that
neither scattered bondholders nor their PLS trustees could do the writing‐
down on an adequate scale.34 For the pooling and servicing agreements
(PSAs) pursuant to which PLS trusts had been settled, hastily drafted as
they had been by lawyers who hadn’t foreseen the prospect of a
nationwide housing price crash and associated default wave, did not
allow it.35 If public authorities could partner with such bondholders to
combine their own condemnation authority with bondholder money, I
accordingly concluded, fair value condemnation awards could be paid at
minimal or no public expense and the loans could at long last be writtendown and thus salvaged.36
When it came to deciding what level of public authority to approach—
state, federal, or municipal—I thought it best to try all. Hard-hit
homeowners, cities, and states that could not wait for the Federal Housing
Authority (FHA) or any other instrumentality to act to forestall
foreclosures, evictions, and associated financial turmoil, even if federal
action was, ideally, preferable.37 In the end, then, while I started with
federal officials and even Presidential candidates (then Senators Obama
and McCain) in advocating the plan, it was ultimately hard-hit cities that
32. See Robert Hockett, Paying Paul and Robbing No One: An Eminent Domain Solution
for Underwater Mortgage Debt, 19 CURRENT ISSUES ECON. & FIN., no. 5, 2013, at 1 (2013); Robert
Hockett, We Don’t Follow, We Lead: How New York City Will Save Mortgage Loans Nationally
by Condemning Them Locally, 124 YALE LAW J. 131 (2014). In effect, the plan was meant to
enable PLS trusts to do what commercial banks, which were not subject to PSA‐rooted
impediments, were already doing in voluntarily writing‐down portfolio loans in NPV‐ positive
manners to salvage their expected values. The plan simply added a step to that process
corresponding to the added entity—the PLS trust—interpolated between debtors and ultimate
creditors.
33. See sources cited supra note 32.
34. See sources cited supra note 32.
35. See sources cited supra note 32.
36. See sources cited supra note 32.
37. See sources cited supra note 32.
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acted once it became clear that the new Obama Administration was only
going to pursue piecemeal “cram-down” in bankruptcy courts rather than
plenary “write-down” in Congress or at FHA.38
In turning from the eminent domain plan to the IVL Plan several years
after the mortgage loan crisis had finally receded, I kept the eminent
domain plan experience in mind and accordingly started with our states
and their cities at the same time that I approached federal officials and
legislators, just in case. And while the anticipated case turned out to be
the case for a time, with New York much quicker to act than was any
other public authority,39 the present pandemic appears to have changed
things where speed and exigency are concerned. Now it seems that both
Fed and Treasury, as well as both caucuses in both houses of Congress,
might be ready to act.40 The pandemic has denied us the luxury of waiting
at all levels of government in our federal union.41
2. Why Treasury?
Now as already noted, the federal rendition of the IVL Plan is
adaptable to both Fed and Treasury use. The latter would simply add two
functionalities to Treasury’s already existing network of Treasury Direct
Accounts (TDAs), a long-standing but little known facility pursuant to
which any citizen or legal resident of the US can already open a digital
account through which to transact with Treasury in its own securities
24/7.42 To convert this already existing platform into a universal digital
38. See sources cited supra note 32.
39. In this sense, contemporary New York might be likened to Governor Roosevelt’s and
State Industrial Commissioner Frances Perkins’s New York, which pioneered many of the New
Deal programs that Roosevelt and Perkins subsequently pushed as President and Secretary of
Labor, respectively, of the United States. See Jessica Breitman, Frances Perkins, FRANKLIN D.
ROOSEVELT
PRESIDENTIAL
LIBR.
&
MUSEUM,
https://www.fdrlibrary.org/perkins
[https://perma.cc/PW2D-Q69S] (last visited Oct. 16, 2020).
40. Philip Rosenstein, COVID-19 Relief Could Be Catalyst for a Digital Dollar, LAW360
(Mar. 26, 2020, 6:53 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1257079/covid-19-relief-could-becatalyst-for-a-digital-dollar [https://perma.cc/TJQ2-URC7].
41. Id. The author of this Article is in discussions with Congressional staff on both sides of
the aisle in both houses of Congress.
42. TREASURYDIRECT, https://www.treasurydirect.gov/ [https://perma.cc/BP46-ZXWE]
(last visited Oct. 17, 2020). For recent writing done by the present author on TreasuryDirect and
possible Treasury Dollars, see, e.g., Hockett, supra notes 7–8; see also Robert Hockett, The
Treasury Dollar: An Immediate Funding and Digital Banking Plan for Pandemic Relief and
Beyond (Cornell L. Sch. Research Paper No. 20-30), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3567829 [https://perma.cc/5AQY-PTS3]; Hockett, How To Keep The
Digital Dollar Democratic: A ‘Treasury Dollar Bill’ / ‘Treasury Direct’ Plan, FORBES (Mar. 24,
2020, 2:35 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/rhockett/2020/03/24/how-to-keep-the-digitaldollar-democratic-a-treasury-dollar-bill--treasury-direct-plan [https://perma.cc/G8KC-TW92];
Robert Hockett, The Democratic Digital Dollar: A ‘Treasury Direct’ Option, JUST MONEY (Mar.
25, 2020), https://justmoney.org/r-hockett-the-democratic-digital-dollar-a-treasury-direct-option/
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payment platform, we would need to take only two simple measures,
which is why the draft bill appended to this article requires fewer than
three pages of legislative text beyond Findings and Definitions.
The two steps, the first of which simply is Stage 2 of the IVL Plan
schematized above in Section I.A.2 and Figure 1, are as follows: First,
we add horizontal peer-to-peer (P2P) connectivity between TDA digital
wallets to the current vertical connectivity between Treasury itself and all
TDAs, as explained above in Section I.A.2. Second, we confer legal
tender status on the Zero Percent Certificates of Indebtedness that
Treasury already issues through TDAs—I call them Treasury Dollars, or
Digital Greenbacks in honor of the national dollar that Treasury issued
from the mid-1860s until the Fed’s establishment fifty years later.43 Even
these two measures would be unnecessary if more than 75% of our
population were banked because Treasury Direct already interfaces—
indeed, at present must interface—with traditional bank accounts. But
because 25% of Americans are unbanked or under-banked while only 5%
lack smartphones or comparable devices, these two tweaks would be
important.44
3. Why—and When—the Fed?
The other way to proceed—the alternative to building out Treasury
Direct—would be to do something much like what I have just described
but to do it through the Federal Reserve System instead, as elaborated
below in Part IV.45 In the long run, this might be preferable since the Fed
conducts most of our monetary policy and we might wish to keep it that
way.46 In the short run, however, going the Fed route would be rather
more difficult and, therefore, more time consuming—for the Fed, unlike
[https://perma.cc/DZ4E-EH8D]; Robert Hockett, Money in Context: Part 2, LPE PROJECT (Apr.
9, 2020), https://lpeproject.org/blog/money-in-context-part-2/ [https://perma.cc/78JM-JBPJ].
43. See sources cited supra note 42. The Greenback, incidentally, was virtually identical to
the later Federal Reserve Note—same imagery and iconography, same size and material, etc. All
that differed was the subtle inscription across the top, which of course did not read “Federal
Reserve Note” until we migrated the Greenback over to the Fed after 1913. The Greenback
history, incidentally, accounts for what might seem an idiosyncratic name that we continue to give
to one of our primary bank regulators, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), so
named because this office in Treasury actually did once control the currency. See Hockett, supra
note 31.
44. 2017 FDIC National Survey of Unbanked and Underbanked Households, FDIC 23,
34 (Oct. 2018), https://www.fdic.gov/householdsurvey/2017/2017report.pdf [https://perma.cc/
8C5G-EEXS].
45. See discussion infra Part III; Hockett, supra note 9; Hockett, Capital Commons, supra
note 10.
46. See Hockett, supra note 9, at 16; see also Hockett, Capital Commons, supra note 10. It
is also possible that we will in the future elect to consolidate some Fed and Treasury functions
that now occur separately. I discuss what consolidation might look like at length in Capital
Commons in particular.
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the Treasury, has no preexisting network of wallet-convertible individual
and small business accounts.
My own view is that whatever we can do most quickly is what we
should do now, with optimization to be addressed later.47 And if I am
right in my conjecture that this means beginning with Treasury and only
later migrating to the Fed—again as our nation’s first currency, the
Treasury administered Greenback regime introduced in 1863, did in
converting to the Federal Reserve Note regime 50 years later—then so be
it.48
As just suggested, both for the reasons adduced immediately above
and for additional reasons adduced below, I think the Treasury route is
best for now, with migration to the Fed to come only later, if at all, once
the pandemic is past and the Fed is reformed on the basis of lessons we’re
already learning.49 To the details of both plans I accordingly now turn,
starting with Treasury and then proceeding to the Fed.
II. THE TREASURY DIGITAL DOLLAR AND TREASURY DIRECT PLAN
Both for the reasons just noted and for additional reasons I lay out
below, I think it best to debut the Digital Dollar as a Treasury Dollar or
Digital Greenback, then migrate it over to the Fed, if at all, only after the
present pandemic is past us. Here is how.
A. Digitizing Treasury Direct
Few seem aware of the fact, but the U.S. Treasury already affords any
citizen or legal resident who desires it a TDA with the Treasury itself.
Through this portal, citizens and legal residents can purchase or sell all
four of the principal classes of Treasury security—bills, notes, bonds, and
47. See Hockett, supra note 7; Hockett, supra note 8; A.B. A088686, 2019-20 Gen.
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2020) (pending bill in the New York State Assembly for creating a
master account and system of individual wallets to make and receive payments to state entities
and residents of the state); see also Hockett, supra note 12 (discussing the proposed Inclusive
Value Ledger which would enable the free flow of money during coronavirus); Our New Currency
for New York, supra note 12 (discussing the benefits of the proposed Inclusive Value Ledger to
New York residents); Our Money’s Not Green Enough, supra note 12 (discussing how the
Inclusive Value Ledger can dispose of the limitations on privately-run payment platforms); Partz,
supra note 12 (giving a general overview of IVL and why it is being proposed); New York Digital
Currency Planned for P2P Payments, supra note 12 (discussing the IVL proposal and the features
of the ledger); Heal, supra note 12 (describing the features of the IVL and its purpose); New York
Lawmakers Push for Public eBanking System, supra note 12 (describing the IVL as a solution to
the millions of Americans who are excluded from the formal banking system); Rosenfeld, supra
note 12 (describing IVL and distinguishing it from Facebook’s Libra cyprocurrency).
48. Hockett, supra note 31, at 6.
49. See generally Robert Hockett, Spread the Fed: Distributed Central Banking in Pandemic
and Beyond (May 10, 2020) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3597724 [https://perma.cc/T99G-WXT2].
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TIPS—at any time, 24/7. All that is needed is: (a) an internet accessible
laptop, smartphone, or other device; (b) a Social Security or Taxpayer ID
number; and (c) a bank account out of which payments for, and into
which redemptions of, Treasury securities can be made.
All that is needed to make this a full Treasury-administered
Democratic Digital Dollar and IVL, then, is to add one new Treasury
security endowed with legal tender status—a kind of digital cash—to the
basket now offered and to establish horizontal connectivity between
TDAs to supplement the vertical connectivity between these accounts and
the Treasury by making them P2P-interactive.
Here, then, is the nucleus of what can be quickly scaled up into a
national savings and payments platform administered by Treasury during
the pandemic, then perhaps migrated over to the Fed when there is time
to build out the Fed’s digital infrastructure. I will begin with functional
requirements, then turn to technical requirements.
B. Functional Requirements
Because Treasury Direct is already halfway there en route to a full
digital dollar and payment platform, the functional adjustments requisite
to conversion are simple and straightforward.
1. Digitize Treasury Direct Accounts
First, the Treasury will be explicitly authorized and indeed required to
either: (a) allow digital dollars (digital Federal Reserve Notes) to be held
in and spent from TDA Wallets, or (b) issue a new denomination of
Treasury bill with no coupon or maturity date and a face value of $1.
We’ll call it a Treasury Dollar Bill (TDB) or Digital Greenback (DG).
There is a sense in which Treasury already administers the seed of a TDB
or DG: The Zero-Percent Certificate of Indebtedness (in Treasury
shorthand, the “Zero-Percent C of I,” or “C of I,” and in my parlance
“Zero-CI”) is a Treasury security that does not earn any interest. It is
intended, according to the Treasury, to be used as a source of funds for
purchasing eligible interest-bearing Treasury securities in TDAs.50
Treasury arguably already possesses authority to digitize Treasury Direct
in this manner and even to issue a new legal tender Treasury Dollar. But
“helicopter drops” into new starter accounts would require explicit
Congressional appropriation, so we might as well explicitly authorize and
indeed mandate the new issuance in the same initial appropriation
legislation.

50. TreasuryDirect Help: Zero-Percent Certificate of Indebtedness, TREASURYDIRECT,
https://www.treasurydirect.gov/indiv/help/TDHelp/help_ug_152-CofILearnMore.htm [https://
perma.cc/9RXC-7V4K] (last visited Oct. 17, 2020).
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The Treasury-Dollarized Zero-CI will effectively be a one-dollar
perpetual, a.k.a. consol, much like the Federal Reserve notes we call
dollar bills. Treasury will directly convey Congressionally determined
amounts of these Treasury Dollar Bills, which I will call “Starter
Deposits,” to holders of TDAs, which can be digitized into digital wallets
as described below. There will be no need, then, to ‘sell’ these Bills to
convey them—a critical difference from other Treasury issuances. Starter
Deposits, perhaps started with CARES Act style disbursements or “Baby
Bonds” of the kind contemplated by sundry developed nations in the late
1990s and early 2000s, then can be periodically supplemented by what
we will call Supplemental Deposits as Congress determines.51 We can
also cap digital TDB amounts held in TDA wallets, if we wish, as
Treasury itself used to cap Zero-CIs. All else being equal, I would not
myself favor such capping, but all else might not be quite equal.52
Existing banks and payment companies might object to unlimited TBD
amounts, for example, for fear of being rendered superfluous by a once
again solely publicly issued payment medium. Financial stability
imperatives might operate to similar effect—if, say, mass migration of
deposits from private sector banks to digital TDA wallets would suddenly
drain most of the banking sector’s liquidity base.53
The latter danger could, of course, be well mitigated, if not eliminated,
through Treasury lending to banks in the same dollar amounts as migrate
from bank accounts to TDA wallets.54 But that might take a while to work
out, not to mention to work out to the satisfaction of frightened bankers.
So, I suggest that we start TDA wallets simply with such future stimulus
payments of the CARES Act variety as we make available for the
remainder of the present pandemic, or with Baby Bonds as noted above.55
Treasury Direct wallet accounts holding TDBs will be much like
accounts held with present-day money market mutual funds (MMFs),
save that they will be sovereign issuances with all the guarantees thereof.
TDBs will, for their part, be reminiscent, again, of the Greenback dollar
bills that the Treasury issued as the nation’s primary currency from the
mid-1860s until early in the 20th century—when the Fed was established,
and Fed Notes began to supplant Treasury issuances as primary
currencies.56 Hence my suggestion of Digital Greenbacks is an
alternative name for TDBs.
51. See Robert Hockett, A Republic of Owners, YALE U. PRESS (forthcoming 2021)
(discussing Baby Bonds as piecemeal asset-spreading policies). See generally Robert Hockett, A
Jeffersonian Republic by Hamiltonian Means, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 45 (2005); Coronavirus Aid,
Relief, and Economic Security Act or CARES Act, S. 3548, 116th Cong. (2020).
52. See Hockett, Capital Commons, supra note 10, for more on when to cap and not to cap.
53. See id., for full consideration of such prospects and means of mitigating them.
54. Id.
55. See sources cited supra note 51.
56. See Hockett, supra note 31.
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2. Make TDBs Legal Tender
Second, if we do not mandate the permission of TDA Wallets to hold
digital Federal Reserve Notes, then, through legislation, we will mandate
either: (a) that henceforth Treasury Dollar Bills will be legal tender on
the same footing as Fed dollar bills, or (b) that the Fed will open
individual deposit-cum-transaction accounts—we will call them Fed
Transaction Accounts (FTAs)—for all who have TDAs, with free
transferability of funds between each pair of twinned Fed Transaction and
TDAs.57 Any and all such accounts will be digitized into smart-deviceaccessible digital wallets as we upgrade the national payments
infrastructure as most developed nations are now planning to do.58
TDBs will thus constitute Congressionally determined helicopter
money that functions alongside garden-variety Fed-administered money.
Of course, the Treasury will coordinate with the Fed to prevent undesired
inflationary impacts.59 Because what occasions helicopter drops is
essentially by definition a significant contraction, however, this seems
unlikely to become an issue.60
3. Add Horizontal P2P Connectivity
Third, we supplement the currently open vertical connectivity channel
between the Treasury and TDA wallet holders with universal P2P
horizontal connectivity among all TDA wallet holders themselves.61 We
do that either between TDAs themselves, in the event that we opt for
Option (a) just above, or between FTAs, in the event that we opt for
Option (b) above. Again, then, TDAs or FTAs will become digital
wallets, out of which anyone can pay anyone else for anything legally
sold and into which anyone can be paid by anyone else for anything
legally sold or conveyed.
As in my Democratic Digital Dollar and IVL plans more generally,
private sector banking institutions can also be required, as a condition of
licensure, to be among those businesses with what I call horizontal
connectivity to TDA wallet holders. In that capacity, they can be required
to offer full, fee-free access to teller windows, ATMs, and all other
facilities at which anyone might wish to convert TDBs into Federal
Reserve Notes (FRNs), coins, or any other form of legal tender cash we
57. For more on the prospect of Fed-administered digital dollars, see discussion infra
Section II.C.4; Hockett, supra note 31; Hockett, Capital Commons, supra note 10. The latter work
also discusses previous digital dollar and non-digital Fed account proposals proffered by various
friends and colleagues of the authors since 2014.
58. See infra Section II.C.4; see also sources cited supra note 57.
59. See Hockett, Capital Commons, supra note 10, for a detailed design for Fed and
Treasury coordination and even partial consolidation can be found in.
60. Id.
61. See sources cited supra note 19 and accompanying text.
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might ever include among our money forms. But of course, this added
feature can also be forgone if Congress fears backlash from bank
lobbyists.
4. Build-In Cryptographic Privacy Protection
Fourth, we will cryptographically protect all TDAs or FTAs, and all
transactions performed with them. We should also guarantee cashreminiscent anonymity of transacting for all transactions in amounts not
already required to be reported to bank regulators under current bank
privacy and money laundering enforcement laws. Violations of these
protections by any government official will not only constitute Fourth
Amendment violations, but will also be legally prosecutable—as, of
course, will be any breaches by hackers or other miscreants. Because the
Treasury, unlike private sector banking institutions and payment service
providers, is not actuated by a profit motive, security and data protection
seem likely to be easier assured on the new Treasury Direct system than
they are now. But there is no need to leave this to chance.
5. Later, Consider Adding Interest on Accounts or Migrate to Fed and
Do Same
Finally, once the system is fully up and running, we might commence
paying interest on funds held in TDAs or FTAs in the future, just as the
Fed now pays interest on reserves (IOR) to banks holding accounts with
it and as private sector banks pay (minimally) on checking and savings
accounts held with them.62 One reason for doing this is that it will afford
our monetary authority—be that the Fed, Treasury, or a consolidated
fiscal and monetary authority such as that I design in other work—a direct
and hence very effective monetary policy tool. Rates can be raised
immediately to slow spending, and can be lowered to boost spending,
rather than changing them indirectly through bank rate policy.63
Should we go this route, in other words, there will be no more pushing
on a string problems or other leakages in monetary policy transmission.
Nor need we hope banks will lend or hope people will borrow in crises.64
We will simply drop money in when we must, soak it back up other
ways—raising rates higher, impounding some funds, or raising taxes if
necessary.65 As CPI inflation seems to have been lower than policy
targets for decades now, though, that seems a fairly remote possibility.66
We shall soon see whether productivity-drops owing to social distancing
62. See sources cited supra notes 9–10, 31 and accompanying text, for more on this
prospect, why it might be considered attractive, and how it might be employed.
63. See sources cited supra note 62.
64. See sources cited supra note 62; see also Alpert, Hockett & Roubini, supra note 22.
65. See sources cited supra note 62.
66. See sources cited supra note 62.
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during the pandemic will increase CPI inflation to meet or exceed policy
targets.67
C. Technical Requirements
What, more specifically, does the technology look like for converting
Treasury Direct Accounts into Treasury Dollar wallets for citizens, legal
residents and businesses, without requiring them also to maintain
separate private sector bank accounts? It is, believe it or not, not at all
complicated. There are several key layers of any such system, and only
one has yet to be built.
1. The Account Layer
First is the account layer. There must be safe, secure accounts that
have reliable “know your client” (KYC) identity authentication protocols.
These accounts are what function as users’ virtual wallets, in which users
can safely store, from which they can send, and into which they can
receive digital dollars. They are essentially bank accounts with smart
device keypads instead of brick-and-mortar storefronts. Critically, wallet
holders have instant access to their funds, which is not the case with
Venmo, PayPal, or other already existing private sector payment
platforms that depend upon multi-day automated clearing house (ACH)
operations to finalize payments. TDAs already possess most of these
features, and can be readily upgraded within weeks or days, not months
or years, to complete the replication.68
2. The Payment Layer
Second is the payment layer. There must be a real-time capacity
allowing for simultaneous debiting of payor accounts, and crediting of
payee accounts, if wallets are to outperform traditional bank or payment
accounts along with the ease and speed of transacting dimension. The
Federal Reserve, as is by now widely known, is developing such a
system, “FedNow,” for clearing between banks—a welcome
development, but one whose completion (a) stands to benefit only banks
and those holding bank accounts, and (b) for reasons unknown, is
continuously postponed by the Fed.69 Treasury can readily supply the
same among all Treasury Direct wallets, and more quickly—the
67. See sources cited supra notes 3–4, for a discussion of pandemic‐wrought supply side
dangers.
68. A surprising multitude of this author’s friends and colleagues in the tech sector,
amusingly enough, use precisely the same phrase in this connection—a “piece of cake.” Special
thanks, incidentally, to Anshul Gupta, with whom I have worked for a long time indeed in getting
the tech design right.
69. See FedNow Service, FED. RSRV., https://www.frbservices.org/financial-services/
fednow/index.html [https://perma.cc/LG8U-45KW] (last visited Oct. 16, 2020).
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technology, again, has long been familiar in the financial technology
industry.70
3. The Application Programming Interface Layer
Third is the application programming interface (API) layer. This
enables interoperability between the system being developed on the one
hand, and various verified 3rd-party services, including PayPal, Venmo,
merchant POS systems, and cross border payment services on the other
hand. These integrations will be desirable insofar as there continue to be
other ways to send money to friends, family, and businesses—which we
might well desire for purposes of at least some resilience-assuring
redundancy in the payments system. But it is worth also bearing in mind
that the upgraded Treasury Direct system is meant to enable costless
payments among all parties who pay or are paid in legally permissible
transactions, such that any other systems out there are strictly speaking
unnecessary, even if desirable for some purposes.
4. The Ledger Layer
The final layer is that of the ledger—in this case, the Treasury Direct
accounting system as a whole, as administered by the Treasury. There
must be a transaction-aggregation locus and a node through which to
inject Treasury Dollars into the money supply for purposes of recipient
self-maintenance and macroeconomic stimulus. The ledger can be
distributed and thus grounded in blockchain technology, or can be
centralized, as Treasury Direct is now. If we ultimately decide to go the
former route, then we might see some increased complexity in
implementation as we make architectural decisions concerning encoding
keys, hashing, and hot/cold storage. Yet the underlying functionalities
and requirements do not change, and in any event, we can convert
Treasury Direct as currently constituted to P2P use without having to
wait. Then any subsequent move to a blockchain or other distributed
ledger technology (DLT) can be planned and executed at our leisure.
5. It’s Not That Difficult
The technology involved in a Treasury Direct upgrade is, then, not
trivial to build, but neither is it daunting or especially challenging. The
requisite conversion involves technology with which both the industry
and other agencies of our deferral government are well familiar. Indeed,
the latter already has departments whose personnel are charged precisely
with performing the very tasks just elaborated. One is the United States
Digital Service (USDS), which is housed in the Executive branch of our

70. Supra note 68.
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federal government.71 Others are—unsurprisingly when you think about
it—the Internal Revenue Service, itself housed in Treasury, and the
Social Security Administration. While we might (or might not) wish to
consult with private sector experts, then, in tweaking the Treasury Direct
system into a network of digital wallets, it is noteworthy that we need not.
D. Pictographic Representation
In any event, the upshot once we are through will look as depicted in
Figure 2, which the reader will note is isomorphic to Figure 1 above.
Figure 2: U.S. Treasury-Administered TDA Payments System

In the diagram, non-arrowed lines again represent institutional
linkages and arrowed lines represent payment instructions and associated
flows. A payment occurs when the Payor instructs the TDA Account
Administrator, via a chip card, strip card, or smart device payment app
(Payment Step 1), to debit her own wallet account in the TDA Master

71. See US DIGIT. SERV., https://www.usds.gov/ (last visited Oct. 16, 2020).
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Account and correspondingly credit the Payee’s wallet account in the
TDA Master Account (Payment Step 2).
At Implementation, Stage 1 of Plan Implementation, counterparties in
any such transaction will comprise the Treasury and one private sector
party—that is effectively what is possible through Treasury Direct
Accounts now, albeit not yet in Treasury Dollars or Digital Greenbacks,
which I am proposing to institute. At Implementation Stage 2 of Plan
Implementation, all wallet account holders in the system, public or
private, will be able to make and receive payments to and from one
another in the same manner. This is all that need be added to Treasury
Direct wallets now to convert them to universally usable value storage
(savings) and transfer (payment) media.
III. THE DIGITAL FED DOLLAR AND FED WALLET PLAN
While Treasury Direct seems the obvious route to go in digitizing the
dollar in the short run, we might nevertheless wish to migrate any national
rendition of the IVL system over to the Fed in the long run. The primary
reason for doing so would be to keep the digital dollar fully integrated,
under one administrator, with the nation’s broader monetary policy
apparatus and payments system—both of which are presently conducted
and administered respectively by the Fed.72
This need, not to mention objections from the banking sector, might
be less pronounced if TDA wallets were limited to low threshold ceiling
amounts, but would grow if those ceilings were raised or eliminated.
Similarly, if the Treasury Direct system is only sporadically used—for
example, only for occasional and infrequent helicopter drops during a
crisis—it also could presumably stay within Treasury, which could
simply make certain to coordinate closely with the Fed during these ad
hoc intervals as it always does in such circumstances.73 This should in
theory present no more difficulty than does the fact that there already are
many bank deposit substitutes that the Fed must monitor even while not
directly controlling them.74
If, on the other hand, we wish to maintain an ongoing digital dollar
system making use of wallets free of any ceilings, then there will be at
least some reason, even if not necessarily a dispositive reason, to migrate
it over to the Fed—again rather as we did when we gradually replaced
the Treasury Greenback regime, our first ever and principal paper
currency system from the late- mid- 19th century to the early 20th century,

72. See Hockett, supra note 9; Hockett, supra note 31; Hockett, Capital Commons, supra
note 10, for full discussion of present arrangements, why we have them, and why if at all we might
wish to alter them.
73. See sources cited supra note 72.
74. See sources cited supra note 72.
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with the virtually identical Federal Reserve Note after 1913.75 The dollar
system as now constituted represents a portion of the liability side of the
Fed balance sheet—hence the term “Note,” which abbreviates
“Promissory Note,” which we find atop all dollar bills.76 And to these
liabilities correspond assets.77
In theory, the Treasury could borrow from account holders willing to
credit the Treasury through their TD Wallet Accounts just as the Fed in
accounting terms borrows from dollar holders. It could even pay a coupon
on such credits—in effect, interest on digital dollar deposits—in a manner
that renders them functionally equivalent to both (a) Fed Reserve
Accounts that now pay out Interest on Reserves (IOR) to banking
institutions, and (b) Treasury Notes, Bills, and Bonds that pay out a
premium to investors.78 This would carry the Treasury well into the realm
of central bank monetary operations, however, the full ramifications of
which exceed the scope of interest of this Article though not of other
work done by the author.79
The reader is accordingly asked simply to bear in mind that the
functionalities of the Fed rendition of the IVL Plan—let’s call it a
FedWallets plan—that I shall now sketch all could in theory be
discharged by the Treasury or a single consolidated authority performing
all of the functions now separately distributed over our fiscal and
monetary authorities, but in practice would then require we make basic
structural changes to Treasury practice and associated accounting.80
If one day the U.S. should decide that central bank independence has
been oversold and should be diminished or parted with, some such
consolidation of funding, money-modulating, and liability-issuing
authority might well be affected as it was in other eras of our nation’s
financial history.81 For the present, however, the plan-sketching proceeds
on the assumption that the nation retains separate fiscal and monetary
authorities—that is, a separate Treasury and Fed.
A. Why We Might Migrate
A FedWallet rendition of the IVL Plan could either replicate the
Treasury rendition and administer it as a separate functionality in parallel
with the Fed’s other functionalities or could integrate the Treasury into a
more ambitious programmatic. The latter option would employ the IVL
Plan not only as a national payments platform, associated Democratic
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

See sources cited supra note 72.
See sources cited supra note 72.
See sources cited supra note 72.
See sources cited supra note 72.
See sources cited supra note 72.
See sources cited supra note 72.
See sources cited supra note 72.
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Digital Dollar, and public option for traditional retail banking—that is,
value storage and transfer as outlined above—but also as an architecture
for a far more effective channel of monetary policy and even more
national investment than we have now.82
In the case of monetary policy, which central banks and monetary
authorities traditionally conduct with a view to maintaining balance
between money aggregates and productive potential, the Fed transacts
with publicly favored “dealer banks” and other privileged financial
institutions to effect policy.83 It (a) buys or sells Treasury securities in
such transactions to grow or shrink monetary aggregates, (b) changes
interbank lending charges to affect money rental rates and hence creditmoney aggregates, (c) alters capital requirements to alter the quantum of
credit that financial institutions can emit in monetized form, or (d)
employs a combination of such tactics.84
In all such cases, the hope is that Fed monetary easing will translate
into greater bank lending to productive and other needful units throughout
the national economy, or that counterpart monetary tightening will
similarly contract credit-money aggregates and thereby slow inflationary
spending activity. The problem is that the hope sometimes goes almost
entirely unfulfilled and always goes less than fully fulfilled. The reason
is not hard to find once one notes the pervasiveness of recursive collective
action problems in any decentralized exchange economy and associated
financial system like that of the U.S.85
During a bust, with prices falling, it is irrational for individuals to
borrow and spend, even when the slump could be reversed were all
individuals to borrow and spend simultaneously in concerted fashion.
Such individuals lack the means of collective agency required to ensure
that all individuals do engage in the requisite spending, however.86
During a boom, in turn, with prices rising, it is likewise irrational for
individuals not to borrow and spend, even when their all doing so inflates
the bubbles that ultimately burst and become busts.87 Private sector
lending institutions are as caught up in this individually rational,

82. See sources cited supra note 72.
83. See sources cited supra note 72; see also Hockett, Rousseauvian Money, supra note 15,
at 49.
84. Hockett, supra note 9, at 16–17; see also Hockett, Capital Commons, supra note 10;
Hockett, supra note 31.
85. Hockett, supra note 19, at 17; see also Robert Hockett, Recursive Collective Action
Problems: The Structure of Procyclicality in Financial and Money Markets, Macroeconomies,
and Formally Similar Contexts, 3 J. FIN. PERSPS. 1 (2015) [hereinafter Recursive Collective Action
Problems] (explaining what constitutes a recursive collective action problem and how to address
those challenges).
86. See Hockett, Recursive Collective Action Problems, supra note 85.
87. Id. at 18.
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collectively irrational logic as are their prospective borrowers.88 A
money-modulatory system that depends on the independently-reached
decisions of such institutions will accordingly lack the means of
collective agency required to conduct monetary policy efficiently.89
A similar individually rational, collectively irrational logic afflicts
national investment in much productive industry and infrastructure.90
Many productive projects, whose value-adds inure to the benefit of large
populations over lengthy temporal durations, do not inure sufficiently to
the benefit of individuals over short temporal durations to induce them
optimally to engage or invest in the productive activity in question.91 It
is thus individually rational for disaggregated and uncoordinated persons
simply to leave long-term value on the table, as collectively irrational as
that is.92 And once again, what is true of individuals here is likewise true
of the disaggregated profit seeking, private sector institutions that lend to
them, whose “short-termism” is individually rational under present
disaggregated and uncoordinated arrangements, even while collectively
wasteful and even disastrous in the longer term.93
These two collective action impediments to efficient money-fueled
productive activity can be readily remedied by limiting the role of
disaggregated middleman institutions in the monetary policy effectuation
process, leaving them to retail lending against a backdrop of publicly
modulated and hence stable money and credit aggregates economywide.94 And a Fed-administered rendition of the IVL Plan affords ready
means of doing just that—means of enabling the Fed fully to discharge
its role as our polity’s authorized collective agent in matters monetary.95
This is readily demonstrated in respect both of monetary policy and of
infrastructure investment policy.
The monetary policy case is the easiest to see in light of the foregoing
schematization of digital IVL Accounts and associated digital dollars. All
that the Fed needs do is: (a) pay interest on IVL Accounts; (b) raise those
rates to slow down, and lower them to speed up, spending activity by
account holders; and (c) in extreme cases, either impose negative interest
rates upon, or conduct direct digital helicopter drops into, these same
accounts. And that would be that—direct, leak-proof monetary policy,
88. Id. at 18–19.
89. Id. at 19.
90. See Hockett, Capital Commons, supra note 10, at 33–38; see also Hockett, Recursive
Collective Action Problems, supra note 85, at 20.
91. See Hockett, Recursive Collective Action Problems, supra note 85, at 20; see also
Hockett, supra note 11.
92. See Hockett, Recursive Collective Action Problems, supra note 85, at 20.
93. See sources cited supra note 72; see also Robert Hockett & Saule Omarova, Private
Wealth and Public Goods: A Case for a National Investment Authority, 43 J. CORP. L. 437 (2018).
94. See Hockett, supra note 9, at 18.
95. Id. at 16.
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and associated effectuality where expansionary and contractionary policy
alike are concerned.96
The investment policy case is slightly more complicated than is the
monetary policy case, if only because the necessary architecture in this
case has not already been fully laid out as it was for the monetary policy
case earlier in this Article. It is nevertheless easy enough to describe
quickly what is needed and then diagram the result. The key point to
remember is that the Fed, like any financial institution, maintains a large
and complex balance sheet comprising many classes of assets and many
classes of offsetting liabilities. The Fed uses this balance sheet somewhat
in the way that Congress uses the Internal Revenue Code—as a means of
policy-optimal macro-allocation economy-wide.97
Among the Fed’s liabilities are the Reserve Accounts that it maintains
for private sector banking institutions, which operate much as do
individuals’ deposit accounts maintained with these private sector banks
themselves. Among the Fed’s assets, in turn, are the trillions of dollars’
worth of Treasury securities, mortgage and other federal agency
securities, and International Monetary Fund (IMF) Special Drawing
Rights (SDRs) that it holds—not to mention the new assets newly
acquired pursuant to the Fed’s pandemic relief efforts. 98 Private sector
bank balance sheets look much like the Fed’s balance sheet, save that the
assets and liabilities include much more in the way of for-profit private
investments and individual demand deposits, respectively, than does the
latter.99 Migrating an IVL-like digital wallet system from Treasury to Fed
would involve adding wallets to the liability side of the balance sheet in
a manner well integrated with the addition of new assets to the asset side
of the balance sheet. It would look, more or less, as follows.
B. How We Might Migrate
As with the Treasury Direct Plan laid out above, so here with the Fed
rendition there would be both functional and technical requirements to
discharge. I will address them in the same order here as I did above.
1. Functional Requirements
The functional requisites to migration of the kind here contemplated
fall into two categories. First come the functionalities of the system qua
payments system, which are identical to those laid out above in Part II in
connection with the Treasury Direct Plan. Second come the
96. Id. at 18.
97. Id.
98. See Hockett, supra note 49, at 20 (elaborating on the new assets now being acquired
pursuant to the Fed’s pandemic relief efforts).
99. See id. at 24–25.
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functionalities requisite to incorporating the Fed version of the plan into
its regular monetary policy operations. Those are unique to the Fed
rendition of the plan, so let us now turn briefly to carefully elaborating
them.
A FedWallet rendition of the IVL Plan would simply alter the
compositions of the Fed’s own and private sector banks’ balance sheets
in a few straightforward ways. First, the Fed IVL Master Account would
simply be (a large portion of) the liability side of the Fed’s balance sheet.
Payments among businesses and individuals would then manifest as
shifting allocations on that liability side of the Fed balance sheet (see
Figure 5, below). Insofar as individual Fed IVL wallet accounts
subsumed within that Fed IVL Master Account were employed in this
manner as transaction accounts by their holders, there would also be a
corresponding reduction in the sizes of private sector bank balance
sheets. This would depend on what ceilings, if any, we imposed upon
wallet account balances. Their deposit liabilities would migrate in some
measure over to the Fed.100
Second, insofar as we wanted private sector banks to continue to
“gate-keep” in connection with business and other forms of productive
lending as they do now—when not betting on price movements on
secondary financial and tertiary derivative markets—we would permit
them to do so in either or both of two ways. The first way would be by
letting them offset their lending with such ordinary deposits as they can
continue to attract or legally open. They might then elect to sell, as they
do now, some of these loans on to the Fed ex post as they now often do
to other federal entities such as the Government-Sponsored Enterprise
(GSE).101
The second way would be by letting them borrow from the Fed ex ante
or ex post through the Fed’s Discount Window in connection with loans
they either plan to extend or have extended—a sort of bespoke lending
rendition of what the Fed, Fannie Mae and other GSEs, and other entities
do in purchasing and thus monetizing bonds, notes, and other
issuances.102 In all such cases, the effect would be simply to substitute
liabilities owed to the Fed for liabilities owed to individual depositors on
bank balance sheets, and add these bank liabilities to the asset side of the
Fed’s balance sheet, thereby offsetting the new Fed Note equivalent
liabilities that the Fed “owes” in the form of business and individual IVL
wallet accounts.103
100. Id. at 20.
101. Id.
102. Id.; see also Hockett, Capital Commons, supra note 10 (detailing, in particularly
painstaking detail, the many accounting implications of these operations).
103. See Hockett, supra note 49, at 20. The scare-quotes around ‘owes’ are because these
liabilities stem from, rather than preceding and enabling, Fed loans to the ‘creditors.’
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Were we to go this route, requiring private sector banks to fund some
or all of their investments through Fed Discount Window lending instead
of privately maintained deposits could have as salutary an effect upon
national investment policy as the Fed’s maintaining a system of IVL
FedWallet accounts for all legal persons would have upon national
monetary policy.104 For the Fed now could condition its lending expressly
upon private sector banks’ lending for manifestly productive purposes in
primary markets rather than upon speculative activity in secondary and
tertiary markets. In effect, we would then have both (a) a renewed—and
far more effective—Glass-Steagall separation of depository from
speculative financial market activity, and (b) an affirmative linkage of
that depository activity to productive investment.105
Another asset side offset to the new currency-like liabilities that the
Fed would take on in maintaining a system of IVL FedWallet accounts
for businesses and individuals would be direct Fed purchases of
infrastructure bonds, “social impact” bonds, state, and municipal
securities (munis),106 and issuances made by any new public entity we
might establish in future to plan and conduct national development
finance. The possibilities here are quite breathtaking in some cases, but
their details are beyond the scope of this Article and accordingly more
fully discussed in other work complementing this one.107
2. Technical Requirements
The technical prerequisites to digitizing Fed administered digital
dollars and IVL wallets are, like the functional requirements other than
monetary policy requirements, the same here as in the Treasury case. In
other words, the same “Accounts,” “Payments,” “API,” and “Ledger”
layers discussed in Part II above would have to be dealt with here in
designing and instituting a Fed IVL platform for value- storage and
104. See Hockett, supra note 49, at 6; see also sources cited supra note 72.
105. See Hockett, supra note 49, at 11; see also sources cited supra note 72.
106. See sources cited supra note 105. For more of this author’s work on the Fed’s new
Municipal Liquidity Facility (MLF) and QE, see Memorandum from Robert Hockett, The Fed’s
Municipal Liquidity Facility: Present and Future Necessities and Possibilities (May 10, 2020)
(on file with author), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3597732 [https://
perma.cc/5ZH3-E4SL]; Robert Hockett, Community QE2: Newly Eased Terms and a New Game
Plan For Use, FORBES (May 2, 2020, 8:35 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/rhockett/2020/05/
02/community-qe2-newly-eased-terms-and-a-new-game-plan-for-use/ [https://perma.cc/ QVU8H4VV]; Robert Hockett, Community QE - An April Game Plan for States and Cities, FORBES
(Apr. 12, 2020, 8:39 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/rhockett/2020/04/12/community-qeanapril-game-plan-for-states-and-cities/ [https://perma.cc/PC5S-XRPJ]; Robert Hockett, Welcome
to Community QE - Now Let Us Put It to Use, FORBES (Apr. 9, 2020, 10:21 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/rhockett/2020/04/09/welcome-to-community-qe/ [https://perma.cc
/GRL4-C6M7].
107. See sources cited supra note 106; see also sources cited supra note 72.
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transfer. Because there is almost no difference between the two cases—
Treasury and Fed—on this dimension. and because the same federal
offices that would do the converting at Treasury can do it at the Fed, let
us incorporate the findings of Part II here by reference as well.
The one difference between the two cases is that Treasury, unlike the
Fed, already administers individual digital accounts for citizens, while
the Fed only manages Reserve Accounts for large banking and other
privileged financial institutions. The Fed would accordingly have to build
out millions of IVL wallet accounts from scratch. Technically, of course,
this need be no more daunting than it was for Treasury when it began
Treasury Direct. Indeed, the Fed can even make use of the same personnel
that the Treasury did when it turns to the task and can learn from any
bugs or mistakes that the Treasury Direct project has by now brought to
light. It will, however, take time.
C. Pictographic Summation and Synthesis
Diagrammatically, then, in going the Fed route for an IVL digital
dollar we would move from a banking system like that depicted in Figure
3 to a banking system like that depicted in Figure 4 where credit-money
flows and associated assets and liabilities are concerned. Adding the
payment platform of the previous diagrams to Figure 4 yields a complete
picture in the form of Figure 5, in connection with which the reader is
hereby reminded that all entities represented above the Master Account
box in the diagram are among the Account Holders, hence Payors and
Payees, represented below that box in the diagram.
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Figure 3: Current Fed/Bank/Depositor/Issuer Arrangements & Financial
Flows

2020]

DIGITAL GREENBACKS

Figure 4: Reformed Fed/Bank/Depositor/Issuer Arrangements &
Financial Flows
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Figure 5: Reformed Fed/Bank/Depositor/Issuer Arrangements &
Financial Flows, with Fed‐Administered ‘FedWallet’ IVL Platform
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CONCLUSION
The technology involved in the Treasury Direct upgrade, or even in
establishing a FedWallet counterpart, will not be trivial to build, but
neither will it be particularly daunting to build. It has been done before,
by multiple firms and networks for multiple purposes, over the years. All
that differs now is that we are doing this for a forthrightly public
purpose—that of installing a universally accessible, fee-free and
frictionless, state-of-the-art national value storage and payments
architecture. As noted above, this is desirable in all times, not only times
of crises. So, in doing this we will also be opening saving and paying to
50 million unbanked and underbanked households, businesses, and
individuals in need of immediate aid during the current crisis and any
subsequent crises.
As the discussion above has indicated, going the Fed route would be
somewhat more complicated than going the Treasury route, and for that
reason the Fed route is probably not up to the task of immediate
implementation during the present pandemic. But in time it could be
managed—particularly were we to start now at Treasury and then in
future migrate to the Fed—as the Greenback paper dollar regime itself
did in the late 19th and early 20th century. As noted above, central banks
worldwide are already developing and rolling out CBDCs in the name of
greater commercial inclusion, smoother payment systems, less leaky
monetary policy, and financial stability.108 Sweden began its first public
trial of the e-Krona project, long in development, only last February.
China will soon follow.
China is a particularly interesting case because it has begun more and
more often to secure first mover advantages relative to the U.S. in
multiple spheres of economic competition.109 Is there really any reason—
especially now, amid crisis—to cede China the advantage, or even global
monopoly status, in this space as well? Surely there is not. Our present
pandemic-fueled exigency requires we act quickly in any event, which
TreasuryDirect makes quite feasible.

108. It bears noting that private sector entities are even now actively engaged in mastering
the new technologies that lie behind what I propose here, thereby potentially ‘disrupting’ financial
stability and accordingly affording us yet another reason to digitize the dollar now if we wish to
avoid a digital rendition of the highly volatile ‘wildcat currency’ days that necessitated
establishment of the Treasury-administered Greenback itself during the Civil War. See Hockett,
Capital Commons, supra note 10; Hockett, supra note 31, at 228–30, for a full vetting of the
subject.
109. See Robert Hockett, America’s Digital Sputnik Moment, THE HILL (May 12, 2020,
8:00 PM),
https://thehill.com/opinion/technology/497427-americas-digital-sputnik-moment
[https://perma.cc/9HBW-CS5H].
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APPENDIX: THE TREASURY DOLLAR ACT OF 2020
A BILL
To establish a uniform, publicly administered mechanism through
which relief payments and other public sector disbursements can be made
to all citizens, legal residents, and businesses legally operating within the
territorial jurisdiction of the United States; and in so doing to provide the
digital equivalent of a bank savings and transaction account to these same
citizens, legal residents, and businesses.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
States of American in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ‘Treasury Dollar Act of 2020.’
SECTION 2. FINDINGS AND PURPOSE.
(a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds that—
(1)For over half a century from the
mid‐1860s into the early 20th century, the
US Treasury issued the principal legal
tender currency used in the United States
to settle all obligations, public and
private;
(2)After the Federal Reserve Note
(‘dollar bills’) began first to supplement,
then to supplant Treasury currency as the
nation’s principal legal tender in the
second and third decades of the 20th
century, Treasury currency continued—
and continues—to qualify as legal tender;
(3)The Treasury continues to issue
trillions of dollars’ worth of other US
sovereign liabilities—including Bills,
Bonds, and Notes—which constitute the
largest securities market in the world;
(4)The Treasury is both legally and
logistically well positioned to issue any
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new sovereign liabilities, including zero‐
coupon, dollar denominated liabilities
counting as legal tender, in whatever
quantities Congress sees fit to authorize,
be this ad hoc in crises or on a continuing
basis;
(5)The Treasury also maintains a
system of ‘Treasury Direct’ accounts open
to all citizens and legal residents of the
United States, through which account‐
holders can transact in Treasury securities
with the Treasury ‘24/7,’ any time day or
night;
(6)The United States is in need of a
universally inclusive and efficient, ‘real
time’ means of transmitting purchasing
power to citizens, legal residents, and
businesses that suffer the income and
liquidity consequences of crisis‐wrought
monetary, financial, and macroeconomic
contraction;
(7)Any such system as that just
described would be both more just and
more growth‐promoting than any less
inclusive or less efficient system can be,
because (a) a value storage and transfer
architecture—that is, a savings and
payment platform—is an essential
public utility in any commercial society
or exchange economy such as those of
the United States, and (b) economic
growth is measured by transaction
volume, while transaction volume is a
positive function of transaction velocity;
(8)Millions of citizens and legal
residents of, and small businesses
operating in, the United States have
limited or no access to traditional
banking and payments services of the
kind necessary both to transact with each
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other and to receive income support, tax
refunds, program and procurement
payments, or other disbursements from
the federal fisc, leaving these citizens,
legal residents, and small businesses
vulnerable to the exploitative practices of
many payday lenders and payment
service firms.
(b) PURPOSE.—The purpose of this Act is
to build upon the historical precedent and
institutional architecture referenced in Findings
(1) through (5) in order to rectify the
deficiencies identified in findings (6) through
(8).
SECTION 3. DEFINITIONS.
(a) Account.—
(b) Account Holder.—
(c) Bank Account.—
(d) Banking Association.—
(e) Banking Services.—
(f) Coupon.—
(g) Credit and Debit Card.—
(h) Cryptographic.—
(i) Digital.—
(j) Digital Account Wallet.—
(k) Digital Equivalent.—
(l) Digital Payment System.—
(m) Digital Wallet.—
(n) Disbursements.—
(o) Dollar.—
(p) Dollar Bill.—
(q) E‐Banking.—
(r) Electronic Banking.—
(s) Federal Reserve Note.—
(t) Interest.—
(u) Interoperability.—
(v) Issuable.—
(w) Legal Tender.—
(x) Payday Lender.—
(y) Payment Service.—
…

[Vol. 25

2020]

DIGITAL GREENBACKS

37

SECTION 4. TREASURY DOLLARS.
Congress shall authorize and instruct the Department of the Treasury
to issue a new class of Treasury Bill, to be designated a ‘Treasury Dollar
Bill,’ abbreviated as ‘Treasury Dollar.’ Treasury Dollars shall—
(a) Be valued at precisely one Federal Reserve Note
(colloquially known as ‘the dollar bill’) per Treasury
Dollar, yielding no interest or ‘coupon’ that Federal
Reserve Notes do not, and differing from Federal
Reserve Notes only in respect of their issuer;
(b) Be designated as Legal Tender,
sufficient to discharge all payment obligations,
public and private, on precisely the same terms
as Federal Reserve Notes;
(c) Be issuable in both paper and digital
form, and any other form in which Federal
Reserve Notes are or shall in future be issued;
(d) Serve as the unit of account in Treasury
Direct Accounts as specified in Section 5 of this
Act.
SECTION 5. TREASURY DIRECT ACCOUNTS.
Congress shall authorize and instruct the Department of the Treasury
to expand its existing system of Treasury Direct Accounts in the
following three manners—
(a) Bank and Thrift Account Interoperability.—
All Treasury Direct Accounts shall retain the
interoperability with Bank or Thrift Transaction
Accounts that they currently have, save that,
pursuant to Section 4(b) of this Act declaring
Treasury Dollars legal tender, there shall be no
public or private sector requirement to convert
Treasury Dollars into Federal Reserve Notes or
their digital equivalent, or vice versa, as there
presently is when transferring funds between Bank
or Thrift Transaction Accounts and Treasury
Direct Accounts in purchasing or redeeming
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present-day Treasury Securities that are not
Treasury Dollars;
(b) E‐Banking, Phone Banking, Credit and
Debit Card, Automatic Teller Machine, and Other
Banking Services.—Pursuant to Section 4(b) of
this Act declaring Treasury Dollars to be legal
tender, no State or Nationally chartered Banking
Association or Thrift Institution shall
discriminate between Treasury Dollars and
Federal Reserve Notes or their digital equivalent
in administering the Electronic Banking (‘e‐
banking’), Phone or Other Device Banking,
Credit and Debit Card, Automatic Teller Machine
(ATM), or other traditional banking services that
they offer customers;
(c) Digital Account Wallets.—The Treasury shall, with all
deliberate speed—
(1) Add digital peerto‐peer (‘P2P’)
Interoperability to all Treasury Direct
Accounts, enabling all Account Holders to
transact directly in real time both with the
Treasury and with one another, so that
Account Holders without Savings or
Transaction Accounts held with other
institutions, including Banking Associations
and Thrift Institutions, can transact directly
both with Treasury and with one another in
‘real time’ through their Treasury Direct
Account Wallets;
(2) Retain the services of the US Digital
Service to design the P2P‐ Interoperable
Digital Account Wallets referenced in
Subsection (c)(1) of this Section immediately
above;
(3) Cryptographically build into the Digital
Account Wallet system all Privacy and ‘Hack‐
Proofing’ protections that Treasury Direct
Accounts currently offer or that Banking
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Associations and Thrift Institutions are
currently required by law to provide in
connection with the Transaction Accounts and
Payment Services that they provide.
(d) Treasury Disbursements into Digital
Account Wallets.—After the system of Digital
Account Wallets described in Subsubsection
(c)(e) of this Subsection is operational, Treasury
shall make all future digital or electronic
disbursements, including but not limited to crisis
relief payments, into these Account Wallets, with
the object of encouraging wide use of this system
as the preferred, universally accessible digital
payments platform for all e‐payments made in the
United States.
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